Actively exploited critical flaw in F5 BIG-IP APM allows unauthenticated remote code execution
On 22 September 2026 F5 disclosed CVE-2026-94127, an actively exploited heap-based buffer overflow in BIG-IP APM that lets unauthenticated attackers run code remotely. According to CERT-EU, organisations running BIG-IP APM with an access policy and an OAuth profile on a virtual server are affected.
What to do now
- Product
- F5 BIG-IP APM
- Affected versions
- 17.1.0–17.1.3, 17.5.0–17.5.1 and 21.1.0 when configured with an access policy and an OAuth profile on a virtual server
- Fixed in
- F5 hotfix available; fixed versions not specified in the source
- CVE
- CVE-2026-94127
CERT-EU issued advisory 2026-013 on 22 September 2026, relaying an F5 bulletin about a critical vulnerability in BIG-IP APM, the access management module of the BIG-IP platform. F5 says the flaw is already being exploited in the wild.
Tracked as CVE-2026-94127, the bug is a heap-based buffer overflow that an unauthenticated attacker can use to execute code remotely on the device. Exposure depends on configuration: only virtual servers that have both an access policy and an OAuth profile attached are vulnerable.
Affected releases are 17.1.0 through 17.1.3, 17.5.0 through 17.5.1, and 21.1.0. F5 has released a hotfix, though the CERT-EU advisory does not list the fixed version numbers. Where patching has to wait, F5 offers an iRule-based mitigation for the affected virtual server, available on request from F5 support.
F5 describes a pattern worth investigating: a series of OAuth authentication failures, then suspicious commands, quickly followed by a TMM SIGABRT. Administrators should search /var/log/apm for repeated "Request UserInfo ... failed" errors with the invalid_token code, particularly ten or more from one IP address in a short period, and run tmctl global_oauth_stat to check for an unexplained rise in total_failed.
If OAuth failures turn up, /var/log/audit should be reviewed around the same timestamps. A TMM core file is not an indicator on its own but should be examined, since F5 has seen TMM enter a loop that causes the SOD daemon to send a SIGABRT. CERT-EU advises preserving forensic evidence before making changes.
What to do now
- Preserve forensic evidence such as logs and core files from affected BIG-IP APM devices before changing anything.
- Apply the F5 hotfix for your 17.1, 17.5 or 21.1 branch.
- If you cannot patch right away, request the mitigation iRule from F5 support and apply it to virtual servers using an access policy with an OAuth profile.
- Check /var/log/apm for repeated invalid_token OAuth errors, review total_failed with tmctl global_oauth_stat, and inspect /var/log/audit and any TMM core files.
- Start your incident response process if any sign of compromise is found.